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Abstract 
 
Based  on  earlier  empirical  literature  for  Central  and  Eastern  European 
Countries  this  paper  attempts  to  analyze  the  likely  impact  of  changes  in 
corporate  income  taxes,  in  the  endowment  with  production-related  material 
infrastructure and in the institutional environment on Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI)  –  and  thus  on  one  channel  of  regional  development  in  South  Eastern 
European  Countries  (SEECs).  Specifically,  we  explore  the  scope  for  public 
policy  to  attract  FDI  separated  by  these  three  policy  areas  and  across  the 
SEECs. Our findings suggest that the potential for SEECs to attract FDI upon 
changes in these policy areas varies not only substantially between the three 
policy areas but also within the group of SEECs. Yet, as a general picture, most 
SEECs have substantial scope to attract FDI by improving their institutional 
environment as well as their infrastructure endowment. The tax instrument, in 
contrast, is largely exhausted as a means to attract FDI. Based on these findings 
some medium- and long-term policy issues are outlined. 
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1. Introduction 
From a policy perspective, investment location decisions of Multinational 
Enterprises (MNEs) are important as Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) may exert 
substantial economic impacts on both, the host and the home country of FDI. For 
instance, from a host country perspective, empirical evidence points to a positive 
impact  of  FDI  on  economic  growth  (e.g.  Ghosh  and  Wang  2009).  These 
potential positive effects of FDI on a host country‟s economic performance have 
been used by governments to justify the attraction of FDI (see e.g. OECD 2008).  
The  South  East  European  Countries  (SEECs)
1  have  attracted  a 
considerable amount of FDI so far: the average annual growth of inward FDI in 
the SEECs reached 26% over the 2001 to 2008 period. Nevertheless capital is 
still a scarce production factor in SEECs and hence there is roo m and the need 
for additional FDI (e.g. FIPA 2008).  
Among the policy instruments of governments to attract FDI are low taxes 
on the proceeds of FDI, production-related material infrastructure as well as the 
institutional environment toward FDI, for example legal restrictions to conduct 
FDI in particular sectors.
2  These three location factors are mostly under the 
immediate control of public officials. That is, they clearly are policy variables. 
This is rather evident for taxes and the institutional environment. However, due 
to market failures (e.g. sub-additivity of cost functions), distributional concerns 
or  “merit  good”  aspects,  the  provision  of  a  substantial  part  of  a  country‟s 
material infrastructure is in the realm of the public sector. Even where private 
agents provide the infrastructure at least the decision making and the funding is 
largely within the public sector. Concerning the impact of variations in these 
three  policy  variables  on  FDI  inflows  the  empirical  literature  points  toward 
statistically and economically significant relationships (e.g. Bellak et al. 2009; 
B￩nassy-Qu￩r￩ et al. 2007a; section 2 below). 
Also  the  SEECs  have  developed  various  strategies  to  actively  attract 
(promote) FDI to their countries rather than relying solely on market size and 
low wage costs as location factors. Indeed, the attraction of FDI has become an 
important policy goal for regional development of SEECs. Thereby, especially 
corporate income taxes play a dominant role in the policy mix used by SEECs‟ 
governments to attract FDI (see e.g. the information given on the websites of the 
FDI  promotion  agencies  in  SEECs
3). As a very general remark, in SEECs 
investments  into  production -related  material  infrastructure  (henceforth  INF) 
have been financed via public spending but  private sector participation in the 
                                                           
1 The SEECs are defined here to include Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Moldova, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania and Serbia. 
2  Production-related  material  infrastructure  compri ses  inter  alia  the  telecommunication,  the 
transport infrastructure and the electricity generation capacity (e.g. Gramlich 1994). 
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provision of INF has substantially increased (e.g. Leibrecht and Liebensteiner 
2011), corporate income taxes (henceforth TAX) have been lowered (e.g. Bellak 
and  Liebensteiner  2011)  and  the  institutional  environment  toward  FDI 
(henceforth  INST)  has  been  considerably  revised  in  the  SEECs  (e.g.  EBRD 
2010).  Yet,  after  several  decades  of  policy  measures  conducive  to  FDI,  the 
question arises, what room exists for further improvements of policies in the 
SEECs – and which impact they would have on FDI. 
Based  on  earlier  empirical  literature  on  Central-  and  East  European 
Countries  (CEECs)  the  goal  of  this  paper  therefore  is  to  analyze  the  likely 
impact of TAX changes, improvements of INST and of INF on FDI in SEECs – 
and  thus  regional  development.  The  analysis  of  the  FDI  impact  is  based  on 
hypothetical  changes  in  the  three  fields  of  public  policy  (TAX,  INF,  INST) 
assuming that a particular SEEC ceteris paribus reaches a “best practice” or 
“benchmark level”. Thereby the best practice level is operationalized in various 
ways. Yet, in any case, the CEECs act as peer-group as they have undergone a 
strong  catching-up  process  with  respect  to  FDI  in  the  past,  not  least  due  to 
policies in the areas of TAX, INST and INF. 
Our findings suggest that the potential for SEECs to attract FDI upon 
changes  in  these  policy  areas  varies  not  only  substantially  among  the  three 
policy areas but also within the group of SEECs. Yet, as a general picture, most 
SEECs have a substantial scope to attract FDI by improving their institutional 
environment as well as their infrastructure endowment. The tax instrument, in 
contrast, is largely exhausted as a means to attract FDI. 
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows:  Section  2  provides  the  conceptual 
background on the effects of various policy measures on FDI. Section 3 outlines 
the methodology and data used and describes the steps of the empirical analysis. 
Section 4 presents the results and section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Survey of the Impact of TAX, INST and INF on FDI 
Especially  corporate  income  taxes  and  legal  stipulations  toward  FDI 
received substantial interest as a location factor not only in the political but also 
in  the  academic  discussion.  In  contrast,  the  relation  between  FDI  and  the 
production-related material infrastructure receives comparatively less attention, 
even if its importance is growing (see e.g. UNCTAD 2008, chapter three). One 
reason for this limited attention is the lack of meaningful indicator variables for 
production-related material infrastructure (Mutti 2004). 
 
2.1. Impact of TAX on FDI  
Theoretically,  location  decisions  are  inter  alia  determined  by  taxes  on 
corporate income through their impact on the cost of capital and / or on the after-
tax profitability of an investment. In the former case marginal FDI, financing 40   Christian BELLAK, Markus LEIBRECHT and Mario LIEBENSTEINER 
 
scale expansions of existing firms, may be altered and in the latter case infra-
marginal investments, earning a positive economic rent, could be influenced (see 
e.g. Devereux 2004).  
From an empirical viewpoint, corporate income taxes do indeed matter for 
investment location decisions of MNEs. For example, DeMooij and Ederveen 
(2008) carry out a meta-analysis of 35 empirical studies and find a median tax-
rate elasticity, defined as semi-elasticity, of about -2.9 for FDI, mainly between 
homogenous countries (esp. FDI from the US to Europe or vice versa or within 
the  US  and  the  EU,  respectively).  However,  the  typical  tax-rate  elasticity 
crucially depends on the tax measure used and the operationalization of FDI 
applied. Concerning tax rates various measures are proposed in the literature 
(see e.g. Devereux 2004). Among them, forward-looking effective average tax 
rates (EATR) in the spirit of Devereux and Griffith (1998) are a proper measure 
when dealing with location decisions of firms (e.g. Devereux 2004). For these 
measures DeMooij and Ederveen (2008) find a tax-rate elasticity of about -5.9.
4 
Bellak and Leibrecht (2009) show that effective average tax rates on corporate 
income of the Devereux and Griffith type also matter for FDI in CEECs. 
Specifically, these authors establish a tax semi -elasticity of FDI of about  -4.3. 
Their analysis is based on 56 bilateral country relationships combining 7 home 
countries from the EU and the US, and 8 CEECs of FDI for the 1995 to 2003 
period. The result implies  that every reduction of the effective tax rate in the 
CEECs by one percentage point increases inward FDI ceteris paribus by 4.3 per 
cent, which clearly is a non-negligible amount. This result is not only in line 
with the findings of DeMooij and Ederveen quoted above, it is also corroborated 
by  the  analysis  of  Overesch  and  Wamser  (2010)  based  on  firm  level  data. 
Furthermore, the relevance of corporate income taxes as location factor is also 
shown by the meta-study of Feld and Heckemeyer (2009). Thus, there is broad 
agreement in the literature that corporate income taxes matter for FDI. 
 
2.2. Impact of INF on FDI  
From  a  theoretical  viewpoint,  public  production-related  material 
infrastructure – if it is complementary to private capital – should determine the 
level of marginal FDI via its impact on productivity and production costs (e.g. 
B￩nassy-Qu￩r￩  et  al.  2007b;  Fontagn￩  and  Mayer  2005).  If  this  impact  also 
alters  the  profitability  of  the  investment,  infrastructure  could  also  influence 
infra-marginal  FDI.  Moreover,  a  certain  endowment  with  infrastructure  is  in 
many instances a precondition for firms to generate rents from production (e.g. 
                                                           
4 One should keep in mind that there are strong variations in the results depending on the time 
frame, method applied, tax measure used, FDI indicator employed, the quality of data in general 
etc., but negative and statistically significant results are derived in the majority of studies. The 
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Richter et al. 1996). In addition, Egger and Falkinger (2006) show theoretically 
that increases in public infrastructure investments in the home economy have a 
negative  impact  on  the  propensity  of  (parent)  firms  to  outsource  production 
internationally. Thus, infrastructure not only has an impact on the probability of 
gaining FDI but also on the probability of losing existing investments. 
Empirical evidence for production-related material infrastructure being a 
determinant of FDI is surveyed for instance in Bellak et al. (2010) and Glass 
(2008).  However,  a  meta-analysis  comparable  to  the  ones  of  De  Mooij  and 
Ederveen (2008) or Feld and Heckemeyer (2009) is not available. This is no 
coincidence, as the number of studies dealing with FDI and INF can be counted 
on one hand‟s fingers. The paper by Bellak et al. (2009) also includes evidence 
that FDI in CEECs is attracted by increases in the infrastructure endowment. 
Especially,  information-  and  telecommunication  as  well  as  transport 
infrastructure impact on FDI. These findings are consistent with Wheeler and 
Mody  (1992)  who  study  the  importance  of  infrastructure  for  the  location 
decision  of  US  MNEs.  They  find  that  infrastructure,  measured  via  a 
comprehensive  index  capturing  various  dimensions,  is  an  important  location 
factor, especially in less developed countries.  
Cheng and Kwan (2000) find support for the fact that a favorable transport 
infrastructure is a relevant determinant of FDI into Chinese regions. Goodspeed 
et  al.  (2005)  explain  FDI  in  a  broad  range  of  countries  and  include  the 
consumption of electric power, the number of mainline telephone connections 
and  a  composite  infrastructure  index  in  their  regressions.  For  the  latter  two 
proxies  they  find  a  significant  positive  impact  upon  FDI.  In  a  related  paper 
Goodspeed et al. (2009) find that a favorable infrastructure endowment attracts 
FDI to developed as well as to less developed countries. Thereby the impact is 
larger in the latter country  group. They use a composite infrastructure index 
comprising  transport,  telecommunication,  energy  and  environmental 
infrastructures. Mollick et al. (2006) analyze the role of telecommunications and 
transport infrastructure for FDI in Mexico and find a positive impact of both 
types of infrastructure. B￩nassy-Qu￩r￩ et al. (2007b) use data on the net stock of 
public  capital  as  proxy  for  the  quantity  and  quality  of  production-related 
infrastructure. They analyze FDI from the US to 18 EU countries and find a 
significant positive impact of the net stock of public capital on FDI. Thus, the 
empirical  evidence  available  suggests  that  production-related  material 
infrastructure is an economically and statistically significant determinant of FDI, 
especially in developing and in transition economies.  
 
2.3. Impact of INST on FDI 
From  a  theoretical  viewpoint,  an  “investor  friendly”  institutional 
environment of an economy, that is the formal and informal norms which shape 
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to enter a particular market, is frequently seen as a necessary condition for a 
country to receive FDI. Poor institutional quality leads to potentially higher costs 
of investments and, thus, reduces FDI activity. In addition, poor legal structures 
increase the probability of expropriation of firms‟ assets which, in turn, make 
investment activity less likely in the host country (e.g. Blonigen 2005; B￩nassy-
Qu￩r￩ et al. 2007a). 
Daude  and  Stein  (2007)  use  a  wide  range  of  institutional  indicators 
obtained from Kaufmann et al. (1999), the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG)  compiled  by  the  PRS  Group  and  the  World  Business  Environment 
Survey (WBES) provided by the World Bank. While the ICRG indicators are 
based on experts‟ opinions exclusively, and the WBES data on country surveys, 
Kaufmann  et  al.‟s  indices  rely  on  surveys  and  experts  polls.  Using  different 
econometric  methods  on  cross-sectional  and  panel  data  estimations,  the 
coefficients on the quality of the institutional variables are largely statistically 
and economically significant and robust to alternative specifications. Daude and 
Stein  (2007,  p.  341)  conclude  that  “countries  that  would  increase  foreign 
investment would be able to do so by increasing their institutional framework, 
especially by establishing a predictable framework for economic policies and 
enforcement.” 
Disdier and Mayer (2004) investigate the location choice of French MNEs 
in 13 EU countries and 6 CEECs from 1980 to 1999. The location choice data is 
collected by the “Direction des Relations Economiques Ext￩rieures (DREE)” of 
the  French  Ministry  of  Finance.  The  empirical  approach  contains  different 
institutional quality measures besides standard control variables. One variable 
indicating the degree of political and civil freedom in a country averages two 
ratings, political rights and civil liberties. They are provided by the Heritage 
Foundation (see O‟Driscoll et al. 2001). A further institutional variable is the 
liberalization index developed by de Melo et al. (1997). It measures internal 
markets liberalization, external markets liberalization and private sector entry. 
The results indicate that institutional quality is indeed an important determinant 
of the location choice. Furthermore, splitting up the sample period shows that 
the impact of improvements in the institutional quality decreases over time. This 
leads to the suggestion of a “convergence in the levels of institutional quality”. 
(Disdier and Mayer, 2004, p. 291) This finding is of special interest here not 
least as it is consistent with the view that for countries in their early years of 
transition, like many SEECs, an improvement of the institutional environment 
seems to have especially large pay-offs in FDI terms. 
With respect to CEECs, Dhakal et al. (2007) explore the determinants of 
FDI  inflows  to  these  countries.  Among  other  control  variables,  the  authors 
include an indicator for government regulations, obtained from the Economic 
Freedom Index, provided by the Heritage Foundation, which incorporates wages 
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regulations  (O‟Driscoll  et  al.  2001).  As  expected,  stronger  government 
regulations have a statistically negative impact on FDI inflows. This result is of 
special  interest,  as  the  Heritage  Foundation  indicator  will  be  used  for  the 
empirical approach in this paper (see section 3 below).  
Thus,  the  empirical  evidence  is  in  favor  of  a  positive  impact  of  good 
institutional  quality  in  general  and  government  regulations  toward  FDI  in 
particular on FDI activity. A positive impact is especially likely to occur in the 
case of countries in their early years of transition into market economies. 
 
3. Empirical approach  
 
3.1. Methodological aspects 
The objective of this part is to show how a policy change in SEECs may 
contribute  to  FDI  attraction.  To  be  more  specific,  we  undertake  a  policy 
experiment where a particular country hypothetically changes its scores on TAX, 
INF or INST in a way that this country reaches the best practice or benchmark 
level. The ceteris paribus impact of this hypothetical policy change on FDI is 
derived. We thereby closely follow the approach used by Bellak et al. (2010) and 
Demekas et al. (2007) to derive FDI-gaps from econometric estimates. However, 
due to limited data availability for SEECs we cannot provide econometric results 
in a first step as Bellak et al. (2010) and Demekas et al. (2007) have done. 
Instead,  we  utilize  econometric  results  which  were  derived  earlier  based  on 
studies exploring the determinants of FDI into CEECs. Specifically, regressions 
coefficients (COEF) recently derived by Bellak et al. (2010) and Bellak and 
Leibrecht  (2009)  are  applied  to  proxy  the  sensitivity  of  FDI  in  SEECs  with 
respect to corporate income taxes, production-related material infrastructure and 
legal stipulations toward FDI. For each of these three variables the best practice 
level is defined, based on the mean or the maximum / minimum value of the 
respective policy variable in CEECs
5. The CEECs, hence, act as peer -group. 
Then, the percent difference (DIFF) of a particular SEEC to this best practice 
policy level is calculated for each of the three policy variables (TAX, INF, 
INST). The regression coefficients derived fro m the two papers mentioned 
above (Bellak et al. 2010 and Bellak and Leibrecht 2009) are multiplied by 
DIFF, if there is room for policy improvements, i.e. if a particular SEEC has not 
yet reached the best practice level in a specific policy field. This gives the ceteris 
paribus  percent  change  in  FDI  (POT)  a  particular  SEEC  could  realize  if  it 
changed its policy to meet the best practice level. Based on POT the hypothetical 
level change (measured in millions of Euro) in FDI can be deduced (LEVEL). 
To summarize, we proceed in our empirical analysis as follows: 
                                                           
5 The CEECs are eight of the ten countries which joined the EU in 2004 (Malta and Cyprus are 
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Regression coefficients for the impact of TAX, INF and INST on FDI in 
CEECs,  i.e.  COEF,  are  taken  from  two  recent  studies  dealing  with  FDI  in 
CEECs. 
The best practice policy level (benchmark value) is derived for each of the 
three policy variables. Thereby the CEECs act as peer-group and the most recent 
year for which data are available is used. 
The  relative  distance,  i.e.  DIFF,  of  each  SEEC  and  for  each  policy 
variable  (TAX,  INF,  INST)  to  the  best  practice  level  is  calculated  as 
((benchmark value – value of SEEC)/value of SEEC)*100. 
If improvements are possible, i.e. if an SEEC has not already reached the 
best practice level, COEF*DIFF gives the hypothetical ceteris paribus percent 
change in FDI, i.e. POT, if a best practice policy would be realized. 
The hypothetical level change in FDI inflows (LEVEL) is derived based 
on POT*(Mean of FDI inflows) to a particular SEEC over the 2001 to 2008 
period. 
 
3.2. Measurement of TAX, INF and INST 
TAX  is  measured  as  the  statutory  tax  rate  on  corporate  income  in  a 
country  including  local  business  taxes.  As  it  has  been  argued  above,  for 
analyzing the incentive effects taxes exert on FDI decisions of firms forward-
looking effective average tax rates would be preferred to statutory tax rates. Yet, 
except for Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania such effective tax rates have not yet 
been calculated. Thus, we stick to the more widely available statutory tax rate, 
which usually is highly correlated with the forward-looking effective average tax 
rate.  
INF  is  proxied  by  the  sum  of  telephone  mainlines,  mobile  phone 
subscribers and internet connections per 1000 inhabitants, i.e. the information 
and communication infrastructure endowment (ICT; see e.g. Bellak et al. 2010, 
Table 1). Of course, production-related material infrastructure also consists of 
additional items like the transport infrastructure and the electricity generating 
capacity. However, for SEECs no infrastructure index which combines all of 
these types of infrastructure is available.  
INST is operationalized by the investment freedom index obtained from 
the Heritage Foundation‟s Index of Economic Freedom. This index ranges from 
1 to 5 with higher scores implying larger restrictions on FDI (see O‟Driscoll et 
al.  2001).  It  consists  of  seven  sub-indices:  (i)  national  treatment  of  foreign 
investment, (ii) foreign investment code, (iii) restrictions on land ownership, (iv) 
sectoral  investment  restrictions,  (v)  expropriation  of  investments  without  fair 
compensation,  (vi)  foreign  exchange  controls  and  (vii)  capital  controls.  The 
index thus covers only the regulatory environment specific to FDI, but not the 
wider institutional setup, i.e. regulations, which would apply also to domestic 
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3.3. Typical regression coefficients and best practice policy levels 
Concerning INF, Bellak et al. (2010) derive an FDI elasticity of 0.64; 
concerning TAX, Bellak and Leibrecht (2009) establish an elasticity of about -
0.56 and with respect to INST, Bellak et al. (2010) isolate an elasticity of about -
0.23.
6 
Using these regression coefficients implies that we assume parameter 
constancy across time and across countries. As already mentioned, data on many 
variables are missing for SEECs which precludes a first stage regression analysis 
as, for example, conducted by Bellak et al. (2010). Yet, given that the regression 
coefficients have been derived on the basis of CEECs in an earlier stage of their 
development  (mostly  the  period  from  1995  to  2004),  these  constancy 
assumptions can be meaningfully applied. 
The “best practice policy” is defined as the lowest (minimum) or highest 
(maximum) values of each location factor in the CEECs for the most recent year 
available. Specifically, the best practice policy value for TAX and INST are the 
lowest tax rate in the CEECs in 2010 and the lowest investment freedom index 
value in the CEECs in 2009. For INF it is the highest realized value of the ICT 
penetration rate in the CEECs in 2008. If a SEEC has a lower (higher) or equal 
TAX or INST (INF) score than any of the CEECs, we consider this SEEC to be 
already at the benchmark value. In contrast, if a SEEC has a higher (lower) TAX 
or  INST  (INF)  score  than  any  of  the  CEECs  then  DIFF  is  positive  and  an 
improvement toward best practice is possible. Yet, while using minimum and 
maximum scores may be relevant for long-term analysis, for short- and medium-
term  analyses,  the  definition  of  a  best  practice  policy  seems  to  be  more 
meaningful in terms of mean values. In this case the mean over CEECs serves as 
the benchmark value (again 2010 for TAX, 2009 for INST and 2008 for INF). 
 
4. Results 
The following Tables 1 to 5 show how catching up toward the benchmark 
value in the areas of TAX, INF and INST may ceteris paribus impact on the 
attraction of additional FDI inflows. Table 1 displays the most recent values for 
the three policy variables in the SEECs considered, as well as the mean values of 
the SEECs. It also displays the elasticity values (COEF) which will be used to 
derive the hypothetical ceteris paribus percent and level changes in FDI in case 
the best practice policy is conducted. Table 2 contains the best practice values 
we use. This table reveals that Estonia is benchmark in two cases (INST and 
INF) and Lithuania and Latvia are benchmark in one case (TAX). 
                                                           
6 The elasticity for TAX is taken from the coefficient of the variable “statrate” in Model 3 in Table 
5 of Bellak and Leibrecht (2009):  -1.90*0.295 = -0.56. Thereby 0.295 is the mean sample value of 
“statrate”. Elasticities for INF and INST are taken from the FE_Pref model in Table 4 of Bellak et 
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Table 1. Current values of INST, TAX and INF in SEECs 
  INST (points)  TAX (%)  INF (1000 pers.) 
Albania  2.0  10  1347.24 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  3.0  10  1462.45 
Bulgaria  2.5  10  2011.84 
Croatia  3.0  20  2254.33 
Macedonia, FYR  3.0  10  1864.95 
Moldova  4.0  0  1207.69 
Montenegro  3.5  9  2235.10 
Romania  2.5  16  1659.31 
Serbia  3.5  10  2177.30 
Mean SEECs  3.0  10.56  1802.25 
Elasticity (COEF)  -0.23  -0.56  0.64 
Sources:  INST:  World  Heritage  Foundation:  Economic  Freedom  Index: 
Investment Freedom. URL: http://www.heritage.org/index/ 
TAX: IBFDs European Tax Handbook 2010, printed version. 
INF:  World  Development  Indicators  2010.  URL:  http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-
development-indicators. 
Notes: values for INST are for 2009, for TAX for 2010 and for INF for 2008; elasticity is the 
elasticity derived from Bellak et al. (2010) and Bellak and Leibrecht (2009) which is used to 
calculate the hypothetical percent change in FDI 
Table 1 indicates that Albania is the least restrictive country out of the 
group of the SEECs with an INST score of 2, whereas Moldova has the highest 
value  of  4  meaning  that  tight  regulations  with  respect  to  FDI  are  given. 
However, all SEECs‟ INST scores are above the CEECs mean of 1.94 which 
clearly shows that there is room for catching up. INF reveals a similar picture as 
six out of nine SEECs are below the CEEC-mean value of 2143. Only Croatia, 
Montenegro and Serbia have ICT penetration rates above the CEECs‟ mean. 
These  countries  seem  to  be  comparable  to  the  average  CEEC  in  terms  of 
infrastructure  endowment.  Still,  none  of  the  SEECs  can  outperform  the 
minimum / maximum benchmark of Estonia‟s INST score of 1.0 or its INF value 
of  2916  respectively.  The  case  of  TAX,  however,  is  different.  Most  SEECs 
impose corporate tax rates at around 10 percent – far below the CEECs mean of 
18.38. While Croatia and Romania are the top outliers in this group with tax 
rates of 20 and 16 percent, Moldova is the bottom end extreme with a zero profit 
tax rate. 
Table 2. Best practice policy values in CEECs 
  INST  TAX  INF 
Min  Estonia (1.0)  Latvia (15), Lithuania (15)  n.a. 
Max  n.a.  n.a.  Estonia (2916.97) 
Mean CEECs  1.94  18.38  2143.34 
Notes: n.a. = not applicable as benchmark is either MIN or MAX; values are for 2008 (INF); 2009 
(INST) and 2010 (TAX) ATTRACTING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT   47 
 
Table 3 includes the relative distance of each SEEC and for each of the 
three policy variables to the benchmark values displayed in Table 2. Table 3 
summarizes what has been explicated above: Most SEECs are better than the 
benchmark (Lithuania and Latvia) in the case of TAX (indicated by the zero 
value in Table 3). Only Croatia and Romania could gain from a tax cut with 
reference to the CEECs‟ mean. By contrast, in the case of INST, each of the 
SEECs performs worse than the benchmark country, with Moldova lacking most 
strongly behind. With respect to INF three SEECs, Croatia, Montenegro and 
Serbia, ceteris paribus perform better than the benchmark when the latter is 
defined as the mean value of the CEECs considered. 
 
Table 3. Relative difference to best practice value (DIFF) 
  Benchmark is CEECs Min/Max  Benchmark is CEECs Mean 
   INST  TAX  INF  INST  TAX  INF 
Albania  -50.00  0  116.51  -3.13  0  59.09 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  -66.67  0  99.46  -35.42  0  46.56 
Bulgaria  -60.00  0  44.99  -22.50  0  6.54 
Croatia  -66.67  -25.00  29.39  -35.42  -8.10  0 
Macedonia, FYR  -66.67  0  56.41  -35.42  0  14.93 
Moldova  -75.00  0  141.53  -51.56  0  77.47 
Montenegro  -71.43  0  30.51  -44.64  0  0 
Romania  -60.00  -6.25  75.79  -22.50  0  29.17 
Serbia  -71.43  0  33.97  -44.64  0  0 
Notes: values display percent changes; zero value means that a country is at benchmark or better; 
negative  value  in  case  of  INST  and  TAX  means that  a  country  performs  worse  compared  to 
benchmark; the negative value gives the percent distance to the lower benchmark (for example the 
-50 value in column 2 in case of INST of Albania is calculated as ((1-2)/2)*100); the positive 
value in case of INF means that a country performs worse compared to benchmark; the positive 
value gives the percent distance to the higher benchmark. 
 
Tables 4 and 5 contain information on the ceteris paribus changes in FDI 
inflows if best practice policies were conducted. Table 4 displays the  ceteris 
paribus percent change and Table 5 transforms this percent change into million 
(mn)  of  EUR  changes  by  using  mean  FDI  inflows  during  the  2001 to  2008 
period.  
As already stated above, the SEECs outperform the CEECs in terms of tax 
policy. No other country than Croatia and Romania could benefit from a tax cut 
referring to the CEECs minimum (Latvia, Lithuania with 15%) as benchmark 
and solely Croatia, if the mean of the CEECs is taken as a benchmark.  
All  SEECs  would  gain  ceteris  paribus  from  improvements  of  the 
institutional quality. In case of the CEECs‟ minimum value (Estonia with 1.0) as 
benchmark, Moldova, Montenegro and Serbia are the highest potential winners 
with additional FDI inflows of 17.25% (mn 34.5 EUR), 16.43% (EUR 48.3 mn), 
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performs best out of the SEECs in terms of INST, could attract additional 11.7 
percent FDI (EUR 35 mn) by enhancing its institutional environment toward 
FDI. When taking the mean of the CEECs as benchmark, Moldova, Montenegro 
and Serbia are still leading but the potential gain of 0.72 percent additional FDI 
in the case of Albania is economically negligible.  
Yet, the greatest possible benefits to SEECs arise by enhancing the ICT 
infrastructure endowment. By hypothetically achieving the CEECs‟ maximum of 
2143.34 (Estonia), the SEECs could raise at least 18.8 percent (EUR 409.4 mn) 
additional FDI inflows in the case of Croatia and the most of 90.58 percent 
(EUR 181.28 mn) in the case of Moldova. 
Broadly  speaking,  there  are  hardly  any  gains  to  be  expected  from  tax 
lowering strategies, there are modest potential benefits for SEECs by enhancing 
their institutional environment toward FDI. The by far most promising policy 
instrument in terms of FDI attraction is INF. 
Independently of the benchmark used (CEEC mean or CEEC min/max) 
the gains in FDI are substantial. To put these figures into perspective, note that 
the mean average annual growth rate of FDI inflows into the SEECs between 
2001 and 2008 was 26%. The individual country means range from 7% to 56%.
7 
All of the hypothetical gains for SEECs in FDI contained in Table 4 are within 
this range in case the benchmark is the CEEC mean value.  
 
Table 4. Hypothetical ceteris paribus percent change in FDI inflows in the 
case of best practice policy (POT) 
   Benchmark is CEECs Min/Max 
Benchmark is CEECs  
Mean 
   INST  TAX  INF  INST  TAX  INF 
Albania  11.50  0  74.57  0.72  0  37.82 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  15.33  0  63.65  8.15  0  29.80 
Bulgaria  13.80  0  28.79  5.18  0  4.18 
Croatia  15.33  14.01  18.81  8.15  4.54  0 
Macedonia, FYR  15.33  0  36.10  8.15  0  9.55 
Moldova  17.25  0  90.58  11.86  0  49.58 
Montenegro  16.43  0  19.52  10.27  0  0 
Romania  13.80  3.50  48.51  5.18  0  18.67 
Serbia  16.43  0  21.74  10.27  0  0 
Notes: values display percent changes; zero value means that a country is at benchmark or better 
so that no FDI inflow can be achieved if policy is changed toward the CEEC benchmark; the 
values  are  derived  as  DIFF*COEF  whereby  DIFF  is  taken  from  Table  3  and  COEF  are  the 
elasticity values given in Table 1; for instance the value for INST of Albania of 11.50 in column 2 
is derived as -0.23*-50 and implies that ceteris paribus 11.5 % more FDI inflows can be received 
if INST of Albania would meet the benchmark value of 1 (Estonia). 
                                                           
7 For Montenegro, only values 2003-2008 have been used when calculating the mean, since the 
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Yet, even if the benchmark is the minimum or maximum value, most of 
the gains displayed in Table 4 are within the range of actual individual country 
mean values (i.e. 7% to 56%). Thus, most of the hypothetical additional ceteris 
paribus gains are in line with the actual annual growth in FDI. This not only 
suggests that our methodological approach is useful but also that SEECs could 
keep the growth rates in FDI experienced in the past by conducting best practice 
policies with respect to INST and especially INF. 
 
Table 5. Hypothetical ceteris paribus level change in FDI inflows in case of 
best practice policy (LEVEL) 
   
Benchmark is CEECs 
Min/Max  Benchmark is CEECs Mean 
   MEAN  INST  TAX  INF  INST  TAX  INF 
Albania  304.39  35.00  0  226.98  2.19  0  115.11 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  583.31  89.44  0  371.29  47.52  0  173.81 
Bulgaria  3949.01  544.96  0  1137.07  204.36  0  165.20 
Croatia  2176.51  333.73  304.98  409.44  177.29  99.12  0 
Macedonia, FYR  287.57  44.09  0  103.82  23.42  0  27.47 
Moldova  200.13  34.52  0  181.28  23.73  0  99.23 
Montenegro  294.12  48.32  0  57.43  30.20  0  0 
Romania  5081.88  701.30  178.02  2465.12  262.99  0  948.74 
Serbia  1497.75  246.06  0  325.64  153.79  0  0 
Notes: values display changes in EUR mn; zero value means that a country is at benchmark or 
better so that no FDI inflow can be achieved if policy is changed toward CEEC benchmark; the 
values are derived as (POT/100)*MEAN whereby POT is taken from Table 4 and MEAN is the 
mean FDI inflow to a SEECS in the 2001-2008 period in million of EUR; for instance the value 
for INST of Albania of EUR 35 million in column 3 is derived as 304.39*(11.5/100) and implies 
that ceteris paribus FDI inflows of EUR 35 million can be received if INST of Albania would 
meet the benchmark value of 1 (Estonia). 
 
5. Conclusions 
Our empirical analysis shows that all SEECs have substantial room to 
improve their institutional environment toward FDI, i.e. INST. This also implies 
that SEECs have a powerful policy instrument at hand to increase FDI inflows in 
the  short-run.  Indeed,  “getting  the  institutions  toward  FDI  right”  is  of 
predominant importance as a good institutional environment is frequently seen 
to be a prerequisite for FDI. Once an institutional environment that allows FDI 
inflows in principle is established, other policy measures can be used to exert 
incentives  for  FDI  inflows  to  take  place  de  facto.  TAX  and  INF  are  two 
examples of such policy measures. 
With respect to TAX, our empirical analysis implies that most SEECs are 
already  competitive  in  terms  of  the  taxation  of  proceeds  from  FDI.  Put 
differently, a policy instrument which can be used to attract more FDI in the 
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joining the EU in the near future as the EU prohibits many tax base related 
measures through its state aid regulations. Yet, as shown by Bellak et al. (2009) 
low corporate income taxes compensate to some extent MNEs for a lack in the 
infrastructure endowment. Thus, for the SEECs it was essential to reduce TAX 
to compensate for the lack in infrastructure. 
As  most  SEECs  lack  far  behind  the  CEEC  benchmark  in  terms  of 
infrastructure in a medium to long run perspective, SEECs need to improve their 
infrastructure endowment to make FDI sustainable and to climb up the value 
chain of MNEs. Specifically, despite the fact that low taxes attract FDI even in 
the case of an inferior infrastructure endowment, this policy mix ceteris paribus 
will only enable the SEECs to attract FDI where productivity of the private 
capital  does  not  primarily  depend  on  complementary  public  material 
infrastructure.
8 For example, improved ICT infrastructure is critical if the region 
wants to attract higher value-added production. Specifically, if the SEECs want 
to attract higher stages of the value chain of production different types of public 
material infrastructure, including ICT, will become increasingly fundamental 
factors spurring this transformation (see e.g., FIAS 2007). It has to be stressed 
that to climb-up the value chain via the attraction of more sophisticated FDI also 
creates the need to focus more strongly on complementary investments in 
intangible  infrastructure  (education,  skill  development  etc.)  in  addition  to 
prioritizing  infrastructure  in vestments  into  production -related  material 
infrastructure.
9  
Furthermore, improving the infrastructure endowment should also receive 
high political priority, as the low-wage advantage of SEECs
10 may vanish over 
time, as the recent experiences in Hungary and  in Poland have shown (e.g., 
Austrian Central Bank 2010). Thus, any compensatory effects low wages (or low 
taxes) have with respect to the lack of infrastructure may quickly be eroded 
during the catching-up process.  
To sum up, our analysis shows that SEEC s which aim to increase FDI 
inflows should first reduce legal barriers toward FDI. Second, SEECs should 
keep corporate income taxes low at least in the short -  and the medium-run. 
                                                           
8 Such FDI may, for example, take the form of simple production stages, which are outsourced (i.e. 
vertical FDI) from the home country of the investor and where the output is produced on stock 
rather than for just-in-time delivery (e.g. standard metal products, plastic coatings). It may be in 
the form of those horizontal FDI, where neither production technologies, nor product technology is 
very sophisticated (at the lower end of the technological spectrum) and where a large part of inputs 
is sourced locally (e.g. in some sectors in food production). 
9 The minimum and maximum shares of labor force with primary education as highest educational 
attainment in total labor force over the 2000 to 2007 period are in the SEECs 11% and 89%. In the 
CEECs the corresponding values are 7% and 21% (Source: World Development Database;  Labor 
force with primary education (% of total)). 
10  Average annual wage in 2008: SEECs: 5802 EUR; CEECS: 10236 EUR (Source: WIIW 
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Third,  SEECs  need  to  free  financial  means  to  improve  their  infrastructure 
endowment in the medium- to long-run. Of course, securing financial means to 
improve  INF  in  the  case  of  low  corporate  income  taxes  implies  that  other 
revenue sources have to be used. For instance, SEECs with a low public debt 
level could consider increasing public borrowing. Moreover, measures to reduce 
tax  fraud  and  to  reduce  the  importance  of  the  informal  sector  may  be 
implemented. Financial means should also come from European institutions as 
the catching-up of the SEECs should be in the economic interest of the EU as the 
experience  with  the  CEECs  has  proven.  Fourth,  once  the  institutional 
environment and the infrastructure endowment have improved, SEECs might 
even consider to increase corporate income taxes again as “infrastructure rents” 
will accrue, which can be taxed without losing FDI (see Bellak et al. 2009). 
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